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I. INTRODUCTION 
Calls for more powers to the European Parliament (EP) in the European Union’s (EU) foreign 
and security policy (CFSP/ESDP) are becoming increasingly common. How can this be? 
Even with the Lisbon Treaty, foreign and security policy is said to remain intergovernmental, 
with state territory as the core organising principle for its institutions.1 In such a context, 
sustaining national democratic procedures that enable the accountability of executives should 
not be a problem. Why then the allegation of a democratic deficit and the demand for 
increased powers to the EP? Is it not rather the case that the CFSP represents a democratic 
surplus?  
 
In this paper I seek to discuss the claim of an emerging democratic deficit in the field of 
foreign and security policy. In order to do so, it is necessary to have a clearer picture of the 
degree and form of integration in this domain. It is only when this is clarified that we can 
establish whether or not the CFSP should be considered to give rise to new democratic 
problems or if it has rather has enhanced the democratic credentials of European foreign 
policy. In this preliminary draft the main focus is on identifying the key elements of the 
reconfiguration of European foreign and security policy in the context of the EU. The analysis 
of democratic implications is so far tentative and not fully developed neither theoretically nor 
empirically. 
 
In the first part of the paper I develop a preliminary discussion of what kinds of criteria might 
be appropriate for assessing the democratic quality of foreign and security policy. In the 
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para 211, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
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second part I suggest that the EU’s system of policy making in the domain of foreign and 
security policy may actually have a number of features that suggest a democratic surplus is in 
place, rather than a democratic deficit as is usually argued. In the third part, before the 
conclusion, I revisit the findings in light of democratic requirements. I suggest that it may be 
that rather than a democratic surplus we may talk of an enhancement of “output oriented” 
legitimacy, combined with a weakening of the democratic chain of legitimation. The analysis 
draws on secondary literature: it does not aim to present new data, but to reinterpret existing 
knowledge in order to better understand what might be the underlying normativity of EU 
foreign and security policy. 
 
II. DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
In recent years, authors have highlighted what has been termed a process of ‘Brusselsisation’ 
of European foreign and security policy (Allen 1998). There has been a shift in the locus of 
national decision-making to Brussels-based institutional structures. This might mean that, in 
spite of formally safeguarding the sovereign right of member states to veto any decision that 
they disagree with, the member states have in practice entered a slippery slope of integration 
with decision-making competence ‘creeping’ to Brussels. If the Brussels-based institutions are 
seen to ‘gain the advantage’ due for example to easy and daily access to information and 
dialogue with partner states, this might point towards a more autonomous foreign and security 
policy for the EU. Such developments may have implications for democracy – as there would 
be something at the EU level that requires legitimation. However, although there are notable 
exceptions, institutions and decision-making in the CFSP are rarely analysed from the 
perspective of democracy. Rather the focus tends to be on the potential of the institutional set 
up for contributing to coherence between the policies of the different actors involved, and to 
ensure efficiency in decision-making. 2  
 
More research is therefore required in order to assess the implications of the ongoing 
transformation of institutions and decision-making procedures for our understanding of the 
“nature of the beast” and implications for democratic principles. To be sure, there is a 
considerable body of literature on the role and powers of the European Parliament (Crum 
2006; Thym 2006; Wagner 2006). However, this literature must be complemented by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example Tonra 2003; Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Christiansen and 
Vanhoonacker 2008; Howorth 2010. 
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analyses of the institutional system seen as a whole, and the entire chain of decision-making 
in foreign and security policy. There is a need to ascertain the authority of those who make 
decisions, identify their location within the overall system of European foreign and security 
policy, and find out to whom they render account. Research might also aim to uncover 
possible processes, pathways, points of access or meeting places that may allow for input 
from citizens or their representatives, for public deliberation or accountability at the EU level 
in this domain. Such research does not prejudge the question of efficiency, or presume that the 
EU’s global influence is on par with existing or emerging superpowers. It does however rest 
on an acknowledgement of the EU as a relevant actor at the global scene whose foreign policy 
affects citizens both within and beyond its borders.  
 
The nature of the EU polity, as well as its democratic status, is contested. To some, 
democratic control and accountability are well taken care of through the traditional nation 
state channels, as the EU is essentially intergovernmental (Moravcsik 1998; Keohane et al. 
2009). Others, while not necessarily questioning the intergovernmental core of the Union, 
consider that such indirect legitimation cannot bear the burden of democratic authorisaton 
(Lord 2011). They link this to the complexity of the (intergovernmental) institutional 
networks. Others again argue that Europe has been transformed to such an extent that 
democracy must be anchored beyond the nation state (Bohman 2007; Eriksen 2009).  
 
The literature on foreign and security policy has to a large extent developed in isolation from 
this broader debate. However, due to its particularities, foreign and security policy actually 
constitutes an important test case. Foreign and security policy is considered alien to 
supranationalism, as its ultimate purpose is conventionally seen to be the protection of the 
‘national interest’. It is in a sense ‘the ultimate bastion’ of state sovereignty, and expectations 
that the EU’s member states will move beyond intergovernmental processes of decision-
making in this field have always been low. If a move beyond intergovernmentalism has taken 
place also here, this would be a strong indication of the EU becoming a polity in its own right. 
Yet, if foreign policy functions are simply ‘uploaded’ to the EU level without democratic 
control, the result might be a multi-level process of self-reinforcing executive dominance. In 
turn this would raise questions regarding the democratic anchoring of the polity as a whole.  
The hope is that the, so far very preliminary(!), discussion in this paper may contribute to the 
general debate regarding the conditions for democracy in Europe through its particular focus 
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on foreign and security policy. Further, it should contribute to the more general debate in 
International Relations regarding democracy and international organisations. But first, what is 
meant by democracy? What are core democratic requirements, and what should we look for in 
order to find out if European foreign and security policy satisfies these requirements?  
 
At a principled level, democracy implies that citizens should be able to govern themselves 
through law and politics; that is, a democratic system must be consistent with the 
requirements of autonomy and accountability. These principles, which are at the core of 
modern ideas of democracy, are identifiable in most theories, and may thus be seen to 
constitute a ‘democratic minimum’ (Eriksen 2009; cp. Dahl 1989; Rawls 1993; Pettit 1997). 
They are an explicit part of Habermas’ discourse-theoretical model of deliberative democracy 
(Habermas 1996). From this perspective it is the democratic procedure that is conceived of as 
key. This perspective may be seen to seek to bridge republican and liberal conceptions of 
democracy. The autonomy requirement pertains to the ability of those affected by laws also to 
be their authors: ‘[i]ntrinsic to this criterion is the possibility of the authorised bodies of 
decision-making to react adequately on public support to determine the development of the 
political community in such a way that the citizens can be seen to act upon themselves’ 
(Eriksen 2009: 36). When investigating to what extent this principle is properly respected, key 
questions then are: ‘who decides – and on what issues?’ In order to find out if it is possible to 
trace decisions back to the authorisation given by citizens, we need to map where and how 
decisions are made. Further important questions pertain to whether or not, and in what ways, 
there are institutions and procedures in place that allow for the openness, access to 
information and debate that would make it possible for citizens to have an informed opinion 
(Held 2006: 262-3).  
 
As for accountability, the issue is whether those who decide can be held responsible for their 
decisions. The key, in other words, is whether citizens can (or cannot) impose sanctions on 
those in power: Accountability ‘... designates a relationship wherein obligatory questions are 
posed and qualified answers required. It speaks to a justificatory process that rests on a 
reason-giving practice, wherein the decision-makers can be held responsible to the citizenry, 
and by which, in the last resort, it is possible to dismiss incompetent rulers’ (Eriksen 2009: 36; 
Bovens et al. 2010). In this context we must ask not only who is held responsible, but also to 




One might claim, however, that these principles of autonomy and accountability are too 
demanding for the domain of foreign and security policy. Foreign policy is different from 
domestic politics as law making is less central, and the ultimate aim is often seen to be to 
protect the “interests of the state” in the face of external threats. This ‘structural difference’ 
may suggest other, less demanding, critical standards as more appropriate. The requirements 
of secrecy as well as of speed of decision-making that arise in this domain arguably point in 
the same direction. Further, given that foreign and security policy is only to varying degrees 
subject to democratic scrutiny at the national level, why should we expect, or even discuss, if 
the CFSP delivers well in democratic terms? One might even ask if there really is anything at 
stake if CFSP does not live up to core democratic principles. After all, citizens have mostly 
been happy to leave foreign and security policy to the executives, assuming that they possess 
the required knowledge to act in the best interest of all. Foreign and security policy is seen 
mainly as an issue that interests the elites. It is only occasionally subject to great controversy, 
and rarely determines the outcome of elections. In the EU, the permissive consensus appears 
to persist with regard to this issue as public opinion is favourable to the idea of a common 
foreign policy for the EU (Peters 2011).  
A key question is however if we really can leave these matters in the hands of specialists and 
elites? References to the common good as well as to the “national interest” are seductive, yet, 
without openness and public debate they may simply cover up for particular interests and 
values. If, as many observers seem to suggest, the CFSP is evidence of an expanding 
‘transnational bureaucracy’, where decisions are made outside the public view and beyond the 
reach of national (and the European) parliaments, how can we be sure that they are in line 
with common interests? 
In the following section I discuss the ongoing reconfiguration of European foreign policy and 
seek to identify characteristics of the CFSP that may be seen as conducive to a democratic 
surplus in this domain.  
 




In this part I point to four characteristics of the EU’s system of foreign and security policy 
that may imply a democratic surplus. 3  These concern: i) the nature of the actors involved in 
making decisions and their potential ability to represent common interests, ii) the procedures 
through which decisions are made, and the requirement on member states to justify their 
positions in manner that may be considered acceptable by all involved; iii) the particular form 
of delegation of power, which may contribute to ensure a stable system of cooperation and iv) 
the interests and values of the Union that may constrain the substance of its foreign and 
security policy.4  
New actors: representing the common interest?  
As part of the ongoing process of reconfiguration of national and European foreign policy 
making, the range of actors involved in the making of policy has expanded. The decision-
making process includes not only member states and their foreign ministries. Both 
supranational and intergovernmental actors play important roles and these may be expected to 
represent the common good in the face of particular interests. In turn this might be seen to 
contribute to an enhancement of output oriented legitimacy. 
Permanent intergovernmental institutions 
The most influential institutions are the permanent intergovernmental institutions that are 
located in Brussels. Although they were established in order to facilitate decision-making in 
the FAC and the European Council, they have gained considerable autonomy. This suggests 
that they may be able to constrain the tendency of foreign policy to be the instrument of 
particular interests (and of the interests of Great Powers) at thus protect the common good. 
At the centre of the intergovernmental institutional nexus is the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC). Composed of national ambassadors permanently based in Brussels, it has 
been described as the ‘linchpin’ of the system of foreign and security policy (Duke 2004) and 
as the ‘executive board’ of the CFSP (Thym 2011). Its mandate is to ‘monitor the 
international situation and contribute to the definition of policies’ (Art. 38.1 TEU). The PSC 
also delivers opinions to the Council and exercises political control over and strategic 
direction of crisis-management operations. Also of importance are the various working groups 
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(Juncos and Pomorska 2011), as well as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) (Cross 2011).  
Research suggests that, over time, these institutions have gained considerable autonomy from 
the governments that they are meant to serve (Tonra 2000, 2003; Howorth 2003; Meyer 2006; 
Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). They do not merely fulfil support functions for the FAC or act as 
coordinating mechanisms for the member states. Already in 2006, Duke and Vanhoonacker 
found that the ‘question of whether the administrative level matters in the foreign policy field 
should definitely be answered affirmatively’ (2006: 380). As noted, the PSC is particularly 
important in this regard. It is here that common positions are identified and the methods to 
realize them are developed. Juncos and Reynolds (2007) have described the PSC as 
‘governing in the shadow’, while Howorth (2010) refers to the PSC as the ‘script writer’ for 
the CFSP, in the sense that its members ‘come up with policies, missions and operations for 
the EU which will allow it to demonstrate both its usefulness and its importance’ (Howorth 
2010: 18).  
These observations of a shift in decision-making power from national capitals to the 
institutional machinery in Brussels suggest a fragmentation of the executive power of national 
governments. The agents of national governments in Brussels have a hand on the steering 
wheel. They have a degree of autonomy and may thus reasonably be expected to challenge a 
foreign and security policy that promotes particular interests. From a perspective of 
legitimacy this may be positive, on the condition that these institutions are able to actually 
make binding decisions and implement them. 
 
Supranational institutions  
The supranational institutions have however also gained considerable influence on foreign 
policy making. Formally, the Commission is ‘fully associated’ with the work carried out. It is 
represented in all the intergovernmental CFSP institutions, and it also has the right of 
initiative, although this is not an exclusive right. In the Maastricht Treaty, the European 
Parliament (EP) was granted the right to be consulted on the primary aspects and basic 
choices of the CFSP. It also has the right to ask questions and to make recommendations to 
the Council in this domain. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the interactions between the Council and 
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the EP have intensified; however, the nature of the relationship remains unchanged. The 
European Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the CFSP.5  
However, the boundaries between external economic relations and external political relations 
are not always self-evident. Furthermore, it is not always possible to separate, for example, 
‘foreign policy’ or ‘security’ issues from ‘development’, which is controlled by the 
Commission. A number of issues fall under so-called ‘mixed competence’. This has led to 
double-headed missions and ad-hoc solutions in which the Commission and representatives of 
the Council have both been involved. In addition, the implementation of CFSP decisions often 
requires the use of EC instruments or financing through the EU budget. In such situations, the 
Commission and the EP are able to flex their muscles. Due to this fuzziness, the supranational 
institutions have successfully encroached on what might originally have been considered 
realm of national governments. We see this, for example, in the inter-institutional agreements 
between the EP and the Council in foreign and security policy (Rosén 2014). Similarly, in the 
area of defence procurement, the Commission has successfully introduced common 
legislation in a domain formally controlled by the intergovernmental EDA (Blauberger and 
Weiss 2013).  
While (in principle) foreign and security policy is supposed to be under the control of national 
governments (through the CFSP), other aspects of the EU’s global activities (trade, 
development policy, climate policy) are subject to supranational procedures. It is often 
difficult to establish clear distinctions between the two, and the result appears to be that the 
supranational institutions gain more influence on foreign and security policy than what the 
Treaties may suggest (Smith 2001, 2004: 7–8). This may represent if not a democratic gain 
then at least enhanced legitimacy, as the supranational institutions are meant to serve the 
common interest. To the extent that this also strengthens the role of the European Parliament, 
it may also enhance democratic legitimacy. 
The High Representative 
In order to ensure greater coherence in all aspects of the EU’s external activities, the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced the double-hatted post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission. Catherine Ashton was the first HR to 
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take over from the Presidency the responsibility of chairing the meetings of the CFSP, 
including those of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The HR also has the right to put 
forward policy proposals and serves as head of the European Defence Agency (EDA). This 
reinforced HR is thus a key institutional position within the CFSP (Vanhoonacker and 
Pomorska 2013). While the HR may also pull in the direction of ensuring that the common 
interest of all is taken into account, this new actor does at the same time perpetuate the 
unresolved tension between the protection of national sovereignty and the aim of a single 
policy. This is so as the authority of the High Representative is derived from the member 
states, while she is also part of the Commission. This is even more visible with the newly 
appointed HR Isabella Mogherini, who has chosen to locate her office in the Commission, 
thus emphasising the importance and relevance of the supranational aspects of the EU’s 
external policies. 
The establishment of a ministry of foreign affairs – the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) – constituted the second major institutional innovation in the Lisbon Treaty. This 
institution, a merger of various branches of the Commission and the General Secretariat with 
an additional influx of new staff, was set up to assist the HR. Consequently, in the EEAS, 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism live together under the same roof. Its logic of 
recruitment contrasts with intergovernmental principles: Sixty per cent of the EEAS’s staff is 
permanent, and all staff is appointed ‘on merit’ rather than with reference to their 
geographical/national origin. As an institution, it is intended to address issues that must be 
decided according to the procedures of the CFSP, as well as some of the issues that are still 
subject to the Community method (previously dealt with by Commission officials).  
The permanent intergovernmental institutions have considerably more autonomy than what 
one would expect within an intergovernmental system. However, there is also increased 
evidence of a mixity of supranational and intergovernmental actors influencing policy through 
the new HR and the EEAS. The second aspect of the ongoing configuration of European 
foreign policy that may affect legitimacy and democracy is linked to the procedures through 
which decisions are made. One might consider if there is a potential for a deliberative 
decision-making process in which there is an expectation that positions are justified with 
reference to a common good or to mutually acceptable norms or principles. 
A requirement of justification 
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Many studies have pointed to significant changes in the way in which policy is made within 
the institutions dealing with foreign and security policy (Tonra 2003; Meyer 2006; 
Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). Juncos and Pomorska (2006) and Juncos and Reynolds (2007) 
find strong evidence of compliance with specific codes of conduct referred to as ‘consensus 
building’, as well as with the oft-cited ‘reflex of coordination’, thus echoing much of what 
Simon Nuttall argued in 2000 (Nuttall 2000). Howorth similarly finds that ‘a significant 
measure of socialisation ensures that the dominant mode of interaction is consensus-seeking 
rather than bargaining around fixed national positions’ (Howorth 2010: 16). This literature 
does not directly address the question of whether or not this putative socialisation process has 
come about as a result of an exchange of arguments where member states are expected to 
justify their position with reference to mutually acceptable norms rather than merely threaten 
to veto a collective decision. However, it may indirectly provide insights into this question. If 
such a process of mutual justification is taking place, this might be indicative of a democratic 
surplus due to the CFSP. 
One important observation supporting the claim of socialization is that the positions of the 
member states are becoming more similar over time. However, the fact that the perspectives 
or policy-positions of member states are converging does not necessarily signify that this has 
happened through a process of deliberation. These transformations of national perspectives 
may decrease the likelihood of the use of the veto and hence facilitate policy-making, but this 
does not necessarily mean that the decision-making process is characterised by an exchange 
of arguments rather than by threats and promises (which would be the logic connected to the 
veto). Likewise, observations characterizing actors as ‘consensus-seeking’ may still be 
compatible with the right to veto. Because consensus-seeking implies that all parties must 
agree to a decision (or at least agree not to overtly disagree), such consensus-seeking may 
well take place ‘in the shadow of the veto’. This would reduce the likelihood of a process of 
justification, which might temper policy initiatives that promote only the interests of the 
strongest. It would be less likely that policy would be in line with principles that might be 
acceptable to all parties involved. 
On the other hand, insofar as this literature represents a critique of rational-choice, 
intergovernmentalist assumptions of actors’ preferences as exogenous and of the outcome of 
decisions as the lowest common denominator of such predefined preferences, it does 
indirectly suggest that policy decisions are preceded by a process of justification. The 
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argument in the literature is that, rather than being exogenous to the process of decision-
making, preferences are shaped through a collective, cross-border decision-making process. If, 
as the reflex of coordination suggests, member states routinely postpone defining their 
preferences on foreign-policy issues until they have spoken with their European partners, or if 
they define their position in a process of exchange with their partners, this does point to an 
expectation on member states to justify their position, and to change their perspective if 
justifications are not acceptable to others. 
The idea of a decreasing centrality of the veto, and of a decision-making process that is 
characterised by threats and promises is disappearing, also emerges from the fact that member 
states often do not have clearly defined preferences. In such cases, they often simply go along 
with the collective position (Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010: 17–18). However, as 
these are not examples of member states changing positions but rather of going along with 
established positions without reflecting on how they are justified, these observations are 
perhaps not that central to our concern. The question of whether or not there is a requirement 
of mutual justification is addressed more directly in a study of the EU’s preparation of its 
positions and policies during the negotiations over the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) Maritime Convention. In this case, member states were willing to forego their right to 
veto when they failed to convince their colleagues of the acceptability of their position 
(Riddervold and Sjursen 2012). This was also true for states with strong economic interests 
that would be negatively impacted by the proposed common positions (which entailed a 
strengthening of the labour rights of seafarers). While this is not a classic CFSP issue, it is an 
example of EU member states making policy through an exchange of arguments and changing 
position when failing to present justifications that are acceptable to others. As such, it 
constitutes a challenge to the assumption that a change in the norms that guide decision-
making – a shift away from a practice in which the threat of a veto is a constant presence – is 
unrealistic. It points towards the possibility that one might expect an exchange of arguments, 
a process of justification that may lead states to drop policies that appear unacceptable to 
others, or that are not considered in line with mutually acceptable norms. 
  
Several observations of interactions within the PSC point in this same direction. Participants 
describe processes in which they routinely succeed in convincing state representatives to alter 
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their initial position: ‘If we have a wave of consensus and you are the only obstacle, then you 
have to have exceptionally good arguments to turn the tide. Sometimes, colleagues have to 
say: “Yes I understand everybody else, and I would love to agree but I simply have to call 
home.” Then everybody will agree to let him/her call home. Very, very often, I would say, it 
is also the case that the colleague will come back and say: “Yes, OK, we agree!”’ (quoted in 
Howorth 2010: 16). Likewise, Christoph Meyer finds that agreement has been achieved ‘even 
in areas where national strategic norms would initially indicate incompatibility’ (Meyer 2006: 
136). 
Member states tend to form their position on foreign policy issues in cooperation with their 
European partners, rather than in isolation from them. Further, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, there are several examples of situations in which, for the sake of the ‘common good’, 
member states have changed their initial position rather than veto a decision. Although we 
lack sufficient systematic empirical studies to verify that this represents a trend, these 
examples are significant enough to suggest that the change of position may be due to an 
expectation hat positions are justified with reference to mutually acceptable arguments. This 
in turn could perhaps be seen as evidence of a democratising of relations amongst member 
states in European foreign policy. 
Establishing a stable system of cooperation 
The third feature of the ongoing reconfiguration of European foreign policy concerns the 
delegation of power (and the question of member states right or ability to revoke it – or to 
renegotiate its terms). Delegation of power to international organisations is usually assumed 
to be temporary, and clearly delimited. The delegation of powers may be revoked or 
renegotiated by the member states. These characteristics are important in order to ensure 
democratic accountability in a system of global cooperation. If powers are permanently 
delegated to a supranational authority the national chain of democratic control is broken. The 
citizens’ elected representatives no longer have a say in defining policy. At the same time, the 
very temporariness of such delegation may lead to instability and less predictability. This may 
also have certain costs in terms of output.  
What kind of delegation of power do we find in the EU’s foreign and security policy? First, 
rather than delegating a limited set of tasks, the Treaties indicate a general delegation of 
competence in all matters related to foreign policy and the Union’s security, as well as 
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identifying the aim of a common defence. Certainly, this general delegation is limited by the 
fact that within this overall frame, each decision to act is made by the member states ‘acting 
unanimously’ (Art.11.1–2). Nevertheless, this generalized delegation introduces some doubts 
with regard to the reality of the right to revoke powers that have been delegated. Presumably, 
it would be easier to ‘take back’ into the national fold specific tasks that are limited in time. 
There is a sense of permanence to the delegation of general competence, which is reinforced 
by the establishment of instruments and capabilities at the EU level. The EU has established 
its own apparatus of external representation (via the EEAS). It may also deploy troops (using 
the concept of the battle group, for example) and it may sign treaties, as it has obtained legal 
personality in the Lisbon Treaty. This permanent ability to act within what may be seen as 
core dimensions of foreign and security policy seems to be at odds with the temporariness 
associated with delegation. 
While doubts are often expressed with regard to the prospects for further expansion of tasks at 
the EU level (for example in the military domain), there are no expectations of a reduction, 
even in the context of the financial crisis. The assumption seems to be that a decision to 
delegate is fairly definitive. In fact, observers even point to a ‘ratchet effect’ in the way the 
CFSP has been designed in the Treaties: ‘Right from the beginning, each constitutive report 
contained within it the seeds of its successor’ (Hill 1993a: 275). Daily decision-making 
processes are also often considered to have a cumulative effect as well. As Nuttall argues, the 
accumulation of previous stances on foreign-policy issues provides a common framework for 
action and decision (Nuttall 2000; also Smith 2004: 141). These observations not only 
underline the definitive nature of the act of delegation but also suggest that each such act of 
delegation carries with it the potential for further commitments. This practice substantially 
diverges from the idea of powers that are delegated and that may subsequently be withdrawn. 
Incidentally, on this issue, the right to veto might actually have adverse effects: If a state 
wanted to dismantle the system, it would in all likelihood require the support of all the 
member states, or else the state in question would have to leave the EU altogether.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this generalized delegation opens zones (or pockets) of 
discretion for the institutions at the EU level. Amongst other effects, a generalised delegation 
widens the scope of initiatives that may be taken by the now semi-autonomous institutions 
and bodies in Brussels, such as the HR and the PSC. In their search for possible common 
policies, they are authorized to consider the entire spectrum from foreign policy to defence. 
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Furthermore, within the scope of a particular task, there may be considerable room for 
discretion. This is particularly the case with regard to the CSDP and military missions where 
the powers delegated to the PSC are considerable, although in foreign policy more generally 
there is also room for autonomous action (Art. 38(2) TEU).  
It may then be that what we have is a more binding form of delegation that what is generally 
assumed. To the extent that this system is not held in check by supranational procedures for 
democratic authorisation and control, it may signify a democratic deficit. On the other hand, it 
may contribute to enhance the likelihood of a stable system of cooperation, and as such 
contribute, from an output perspective, to ensure the well being of citizens. 
Bound by common principles and values 
The fourth and final feature of the CFSP, concerns the purpose, or raison d’être, of the 
intergovernmental endeavour. To the extent that the participation in the CFSP binds the 
member states to common values and principles, this may also point to increased output 
oriented legitimacy. 
An intergovernmental entity exists to serve the member states, to assist them in solving 
concrete problems, to ensure the protection of their interests and values and allow them to 
more effectively enforce their preferences. However, in the case of the EU’s foreign and 
security policy, there has been a conscious effort to go beyond this – to define European 
interests as well as European values. The most coherent definition of these interests and 
values may be found in the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in 
December 2003. The Security Strategy ‘established principles and set clear objectives for 
advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values’ (Council of the European 
Union 2008). It set out three strategic objectives for European security: ‘tackling key threats, 
building security in our neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on 
effective multilateralism’ (Council of the European Union 2003). The conception of the EU as 
an actor with a purpose of its own beyond that of serving the interests and preferences of the 
member states can also be identified in the Treaty texts. In the Lisbon Treaty, we find: ‘the 
Union shall […] assert its identity on the international scene’ (Title I, Art. 2). This seems to 
constitute a definite departure from the fourth feature of intergovernmentalism, and bind 
member states to a cooperative endeavour aiming for a greater common good and to an 
overarching normative frame. 
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Through these definitions of the interests and values of the EU, constraints are also placed on 
the actions of individual member states. These limitations are partly of a legal nature: The 
member states are, according to Article 11(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon, legally bound to 
support the Union’s external and security policy ‘actively and unreservedly in a spirit of 
loyalty and mutual solidarity’. In fact, according to Cremona, ‘the most important element of 
the Treaty of Lisbon from the perspective of foreign policy coherence is the clear external 
mandate given to the Union as a whole in both substantive and instrumental terms’ (Cremona 
2008: 35). However, equally important is the binding force of norms and institutions 
established prior to the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, despite the well-known solo initiatives of some 
of the EU’s member states in situations of crisis, it is increasingly difficult for member states 
to escape expectations of consistency between national foreign policy and the foreign-policy 
positions of the EU (Sjursen 2003). 
The development of an overarching normative frame, in turn, constrains the member states’ 
ability to freely define national foreign and security policy. Participation in the CFSP has led 
to a re-orientation of the foreign policies of member states. Already in 1996, Alfred Pijpers 
(1996: 252) noted this trend, as did Torreblanca a few years later with regard to Spain 
(Torreblanca 2001:11–12). In addition, there is evidence that the largest member states 
(France, Germany and the UK) have undergone such a transformation as a result of their 
membership in the CFSP (Aggestam 2004). The requirement to consult, under which national 
positions must be justified in a manner that makes them acceptable to all, might contribute to 
a situation in which member states seek a certain consistency between their claims and the 
underlying constitutive principles of the EU (Sjursen 2003). 
The definition of a common purpose beyond the individual preferences and values of the 
member states is reinforced through the unity of the legal order, which was established with 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Generally, discussion of the abolition of the pillar structure has focused 
on the limitations of this change, stemming from the fact that the CFSP is still subject to 
specific rules and procedures (House of Commons 2008). However, with regard to the overall 
purpose of the CFSP and the principles to which it is bound, the unity of the legal order does 
make a significant difference. With the abolition of the pillar structure, the CFSP became 
subject to the same constitutional control standards as the rest of the EU. The Charter of 
Rights is binding for the EU as a whole, hence also for foreign, security and defence policy. 
This raises the stakes to some extent with regard to expectations of consistency, as it 
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introduces an element of legal accountability. However, it is still the case that the EU lacks 
formal mechanisms to sanction those who do not comply with collectively agreed-upon policy, 
or indeed with any of the constraints introduced in the Treaties. 
A specific conception of European interests and values has been developed. Thus, the EU has 
already taken a step towards the establishment of institutions devoted to the Union itself, 
rather than to the member states. This suggests that when the EU acts, it does so for purposes 
that extent beyond the delegated authority of the member states. What the EU does must be 
consistent with the Treaties and the overarching normative framework of the EU, not only 
with the interests of the member states. Furthermore, the identification of the EU’s values 
impacts the formulation of the member states’ own foreign policies. This would suggest that 
the CFSP may enhance output oriented legitimacy – as it binds national foreign policies to 
certain generally accepted principles and rights. 
In sum, there are a number of features of the ongoing reconfiguration of European Foreign 
and Security Policy that may suggest that output oriented legitimacy may be enhanced. The 
question is if we may go as far as claiming that this means the CFSP carries with it a 
democratic surplus? 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
Arguably, there is a democratising and ‘civilising’ element to the development of the CFSP. 
This may particularly be so as the requirement for national executives to justify their positions 
and actions is much more intense than in the traditional international setting (Keohane et al. 
2009). The expectation that national governments justify their policies is probably fortified by 
the legal obligations resulting from the unified legal framework established by the Lisbon 
Treaty. There are now some formal legal obligations, such as the Charter of Rights, to which 
governments must refer when justifying their policies, in addition to the overall normative 
ethos of CFSP. However, already prior to the Lisbon Treaty there is evidence of such a 
normative ethos impacting on the substance of European foreign policy. Observers often 
highlight the EU’s policy of democracy promotion, its introduction of human rights clauses in 
all trade agreements, its emphasis on encouraging regional cooperation and its focus on 
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building international institutions as representative examples of the normative ethos of the 
EU’s foreign and security policy. 
Policy is shaped with reference to values and principles that are seen as particular to the 
Union, and not with exclusive reference to the interests and values of the member states. 
Often, states refrain from vetoing decisions, or change their position, in order to facilitate 
common policies in line with such principles. Although member states maintain their legal 
competences in all matters of foreign and security policy, these competences are not exclusive 
to them. Thus, two parallel but interwoven systems of foreign policy are emerging – that of 
the nation states and that of the EU. These bind a d constrain member states and may 
contribute to tame self interested power politics. 
Nevertheless, questions of legitimacy are not only linked to policy content. From the 
perspective of democratic legitimacy, a key question is to what extent procedures that may 
ensure that the viewpoints of all those affected by decisions may be heard are in place. 
Ultimately, those that abide by the law should also be seen as its authors. Further, it should be 
possible for citizens to hear the justifications for policies made and to hold those that make 
them to account. The ability of the CFSP/CSDP system to live up to these requirements of 
autonomy and accountability is under pressure.  
 
A key challenge is to identify ‘who decides’. It is often difficult to know, or predict, where 
responsibility for decisions actually lies. Foreign and security policy is made through 
interactions and exchanges between the executive branches of the member states. This makes 
it difficult to disaggregate decisions and trace them back to individual ministers or 
governments. Key actors are the representatives of the member states in Brussels, whose 
autonomy and room for discretion is considerable. Other actors, such as the supranational 
institutions and NGOs, also in some cases wield influence. Yet these actors operate without 
explicit mandate from the citizens and are not accountable to them. 
The justifications of foreign policies take place between and among executives. To the extent 
that accountability plays a part, it is a matter of legal accountability (through national courts) 
and not accountability to elected representatives. Also, as mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance are not in place, those in power may simply ‘talk the talk’ and act regardless. 
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Consequently, this form of collective, cross-national decision making seems difficult to 
reconcile with the principle that it should be possible to trace decisions back to a form of 
authorisation by the citizens. Such authorisation would probably require institutions and 
procedures beyond the individual nation states that would allow citizens access to information 
about what goes on amongst the executives and to have an informed opinion. Given that 
developments so far are the result mainly of informal practice, however, it is difficult to 
establish procedures that may compensate for their effects on citizens’ status as authors of the 
policies. Also, there is a sense of contingency or haphazardness about which issues are 
brought outside the intergovernmental mode of decision making, which makes it difficult to 
ensure proper channels and mechanisms of authorisation. To the extent that there is a general 
pattern, it might be that of segmented policy making and the coexistence and overlapping of 
parallel systems of foreign policy. The institutions established in Brussels are part of the 
national executives, but their semi-autonomy contributes to a fragmentation of these same 
executives. The fragmentation of European foreign and security policy is also notable in that 
although member states maintain their legal competences in all matters of foreign and security 
policy, it is not exclusive to them.  
 
There are of course exceptions. In the most dramatic international events or crises, it is much 
easier to trace the lines of authority back to national executives. Also, when it comes to 
implementation the EU must rely mostly on the national system. However, this does not solve 
the challenges involved in tracing those responsible and holding them to account. 
 
As it is difficult to find out where decisions are actually made, it is also unclear who should be 
accountable. The EP has, through active pressure, gradually extended its influence (Barbé 
2004; Maurer et al. 2005; Crum 2009). The general rule is, however, that it is only consulted 
on the main aspects and basic choices made in the field of foreign and security policy and is 
kept informed of how those policies evolve. With the establishment of the EEAS it has 
succeeded in strengthening its position a little further, as the High Representative is subject to 
Parliamentary questioning on the same basis as the Commissioners. Further, its role in 
deciding on the budget of the EEAS is important. And finally, its active involvement in the 
discussion on the entire set-up of the EEAS suggests that it may in future be a more influential 
actor. However, it is widely acknowledged that it neither authorises decisions, nor is able to 
hold those that make decisions accountable (Bono 2006; Peters et al. 2008; Crum 2009). 
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Moreover, the powers of national parliaments are limited due to these very departures from 
the core premises of intergovernmentalism. 
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper I have addressed the general question of what might be the normative added 
value of establishing a common European foreign and security policy. What might be the 
normativity of CFSP? This question is alluded to in several strands of the literature on the 
EU’s foreign and security policy. We find echoes of such debates in the literature on what the 
EU “does” in foreign policy, as well as in the literature examining the powers of the European 
and national parliaments in this policy domain. However, in this paper I have sought to 
discuss the question through an analysis of the norms and principles that govern the practice 
of policy making in foreign and security policy, and through an effort to discuss the main 
features of this distinct system of decision-making. 
 
On the one hand, one may argue that the CFSP has contributed to tame power politics not 
only in relations between member states but also in their collective relations with third 
countries. Arguably it has also enhanced transparency and access to information, amongst 
others due to the persistent calls by the EP for more power, influence and information. 
However, at the same time this suggests that something beyond intergovernmentalism appears 
to have developed at the EU level and requires legitimation. It is difficult to see that this can 
be ensured through national procedures for accountability and authorization, and the question 
then is to what extent the output oriented legitimation may compensate for this lack of 
influence of national parliaments. 
 
The CFSP does not simply perpetuate the traditions established at the national level through 
intergovernmental arrangements. It contributes to remove foreign and security policy further 
from citizens’ influence. Executive dominance in this field has been reinforced to the 
detriment of the legislative branch; yet equally striking is the fragmentation of the (executive) 
foreign-policy apparatus. National foreign and security policies are integrated in a semi-
autonomous institutional structure, which has developed a ‘higher order’ conception of 




The CFSP does not develop in a vacuum; it may be seen as part of a more general trend in 
global politics. New forms of governance emerge beyond the bounds of the (democratic) 
national state. Problems and their solutions are defined and solved in a transnational and 
global context (Zürn 2005; Eriksen 2006). From the perspective of citizens, developments are 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the strengthening of international law and international 
institutions enhance citizens’ scope of action. Developments in the direction of a civil society 
at the international level, involving transnational movements and non-governmental 
organisations, allow for transnational solidarity and common action (Bohman 1999; Held and 
Koenig–Archibugi 2005). Most importantly, they enhance citizens’ rights at the expense of 
the sovereign state. According to Hauke Brunkhorst (2011) a legal revolution has taken place 
since the end of the Second World War: ‘The old rule of equal sovereignty of states became 
the “sovereign equality” under international law. Individual human beings became subject to 
international law, democracy became an emerging right or legal principle that is valid also 
against sovereign states, and the right to have rights, which Arendt missed in the 1940s, is 
now a legal norm that binds the international community.’ (Brunkhorst 2011: 12). The point is 
not that these are always respected, but rather that when they are not over held actors break 
the law. However, the rise of a global regime of rights also gives rise to a fundamental 
dilemma. Although rights have been strengthened, the question is if these are rights that 
citizens have given to themselves.  
The European Union is often described as an engine of such global transformations. 
According to its Security Strategy it aims to develop a rule based international order, stronger 
international society and well-functioning international institutions (Council of the European 
Union 2003). The United Nations is identified as the cornerstone of global order and the EU 
includes a human rights clause in all its international agreements. In so far as the CFSP has 
acted as an agent for transformation of the international order, in favour of stronger 
cosmopolitan law, it may be seen as part of the wave of post national ‘good’ governance 
(Brunkhorst 2011: 13. Also Eriksen 2006; Sjursen 2006). However, even ‘good governance’ 
is not democratic.  
Without solid grounding in democratic procedures we have less tools at our disposal to ensure 
that post national governance does not turn from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ (Brunkhorst 2011). Against 
the backdrop of the ‘war against terror’ and the global financial crisis, as well as the rise of 
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new powers – some with scant consideration for human rights, this may be a particular source 
of concern.  
On the other hand, foreign and security policy is perhaps no longer an issue that citizens and 
parliaments are willing to blindly put in the hands of the executive. The permissive consensus 
may become less so. This may also be the case with regard to the CFSP, if it bows to the 
considerable structural pressure for it to abandon its Kantian stance and position itself in 
accordance with what many consider the emergence of a new balance of power. Thus in the 
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